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ABSTRACT  
Jingran indicates that the (non)occurrence of a situation that it presents 
contradicts the expectation, while guoran indicates that the (non)occurrence of a 
situation presented by it converges with the expectation. Arguing against Hsieh’s 
(2005, 2006a, 2006b) proposal that evaluative modals in Mandarin do not have a 
model-theoretic semantics, I propose that, given that the expectation serves as a 
modal base B which an evaluative conversational background forms, jingran 
presents a proposition which represents a simple necessity of negation in a 
possible world w with respect to B, whereas guoran presents a proposition which 
is equivalent to a simple necessity in a possible world w  with respect to B. 
Contrary to Hsieh’s claim that modality in Mandarin has a language-specific 
property, i.e., that the semantics of certain modals in Mandarin cannot be defined 
in terms of possibility and necessity, I seek to fit modality in Mandarin into a 
bigger picture of modality in general and show that it is possible to achieve a 
universally valid notional category of modality, similar to the works of Kratzer 
(1981), though different languages may have language-specific choices for modal 
bases, which result in different types of modality in languages. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, I examine the semantics of two evaluative modals in 
Mandarin: jingran and guoran. Jingran denotes the divergence of the 
(non)occurrence of a situation from the expectation, and guoran 
expresses the convergence of the (non)occurrence of a situation with the 
expectation. See the examples below. 
 
(1)  a.  ta  jingran  lai  le 
     h e   JINGRAN come Prc
1
     ‘He  came  (contrary  to  expectation)!’ 
b. ta jingran mei    lai 
     h e   JINGRAN not come 
          ‘He did not come (contrary to expectation)!’ 
 
(2) a. ta guoran lai      le 
     h e   GUORAN come Prc 
     ‘He  came  (as  expected).’ 
b. ta guoran mei lai 
     h e   GUORAN not come 
          ‘He did not come (as expected).’ 
 
The two sets of examples clearly show the meanings of jingran and 
guoran. In (1a), jingran indicates that the occurrence of the he come 
event contradicts the expectation. In (1b), jingran denotes that the 
nonoccurrence of the same event contradicts the expectation. On the 
other hand, in (2a), guoran expresses that the occurrence of the he come 
event matches the expectation and in (2b) guoran indicates that the 
nonoccurrence of the same event matches the expectation. 
The question as to whether the expectation is that of the speaker or of 
someone else’s depends on the context. For example, without a context, 
such as those in the examples above, it is the expectation of the speaker. 
That is, by default, jingran and guoran evaluate a proposition against the 
expectation of the speaker. However, it is not always the expectation of 
                                                 
1  The abbreviations used in this paper include: CL for a classifier, DE for the 
modifier-modifiee marker, Disp for a disposal marker, Exp for the experiential marker, 
pass for a passive marker, Pfv for the perfective marker, poss for a possessive marker, 
Prg for the progressive marker, Prc for a sentence particle, and Rel for a relative marker. 
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Semantics of Jingran and Guoran 
the speaker against which these two modals evaluate a proposition. See 
the example below. 
 
(3)  ta  jingran  lai   le  guoran  bu  chu  wo  suo  liao 
he JINGRAN come Prc GUORAN not out I      suo expect 
‘He has come (contrary to general expectation), just as I expected.’
2
 
This is a very interesting example. If both jingran and guoran relied 
on the speaker’s expectation, they would be incompatible and could not 
occur in the same sentence. However, in (3), they occur in the same 
sentence. The second part of (3) specifies that the source of the 
expectation is the speaker. Hence, jingran in the first part of the sentence 
has to express that the occurrence of the he come event contradicts the 
general expectation. 
Hsieh (2005, 2006a, 2006b) examines the semantics of modals in 
Mandarin and proposes that the semantics of evaluative modals cannot 
be captured by necessity and possibility and that evaluative modals do 
not have a model-theoretic semantics. She further suggests that to 
identify modals, Mandarin requires language-specific semantic criteria 
because the semantics of certain modals in Mandarin cannot be defined 
in terms of necessity and possibility, contrary to Kratzer (1981). 
However, I would like to argue against Hsieh’s proposal and 
demonstrate that the semantics of at least two evaluative modals, i.e., 
jingran and guoran, can be defined in terms of necessity. That is, 
contrary to Hsieh’s idea, I would like to argue for model-theoretic 
semantics for these two evaluative modals and to try to fit modality in 
Mandarin into the bigger picture of modality in general. 
Modals seem to have very different semantics, e.g., stipulation, 
obligation, permission, ability, etc. But, in the literature such as Kratzer 
(1977, 1981), modals are argued to share two semantic features: the 
semantics of all of the modals can all be defined in terms of possibility 
and necessity and their differences are due to different modal bases. In 
this paper I demonstrate that the semantics of both jingran and guoran 
can be defined in terms of necessity, and therefore that they are modals. 
                                                 
2 I would like to express my gratitude to a reviewer for bringing this example to my 
attention. I also thank the audience at the 9
th CLSW for providing another example that 
shows the same point. 
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They differ from other types of modals because their semantics rely on 
an evaluative modal base while the semantics of other types of modals 
rely on other kinds of modal bases.
3
Few linguists, if any, have paid attention to the semantics of 
evaluative modals, much less their formal semantics. I choose to discuss 
the semantics of jingran and guoran because intuitively they are a pair of 
antonyms and they have higher frequency of occurrence in the Sinica 
Corpus than the other evaluative modals. By means of an examination of 
the semantics of jingran and guoran, I intend for this paper to serve as a 
starting point and a base for comparison for future studies on the (formal) 
semantics of the other evaluative modals in Mandarin and of those in 
other languages.
4
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature on the semantics and classification of evaluative modals. 
Section 3 discusses examples. Section 4 provides model-theoretic 
semantics for the two evaluative modals jingran and guoran. Section 5 
concludes this paper. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Little research, if any, has been devoted to the semantics of 
evaluative modals. The major types of modality most commonly 
discussed in the literature, such as Perkins (1983), Palmer (2001), etc., 
include epistemic modality, deontic modality, and dynamic modality. 
Perkins (1983: 12) even rules out evaluative modality, such as good, 
                                                 
3 I would like to thank a reviewer’s suggestion that this issue be discussed here so as to 
make the scope of this paper more clear. The reviewer also asks an important question: If 
jingran and guoran are modals, why can they not occur in negation, A-not-A, short 
answers, etc.? For this question, I would like to point out that not all modals in Mandarin 
can occur in the constructions mentioned above. Take bixu ‘must’ as an example. Bixu is 
a deontic modal which expresses a strong sense of obligation. Bixu cannot be negated, 
i.e., bu bixu ‘no must’ is bad. Bixu does not occur in A-not-A, i.e., bixu bu bixu and bi bu 
bixu are bad. Bixu does not occur as a short answer, e.g., if someone asks “wo bixu qu ma? 
‘Must I go?’”, people usually do not respond “bixu’, but “dui ‘yes’” or simply repeat the 
whole sentence ni bixu qu ‘you must go’. I agree with Kratzer and Hsieh in that modality 
is a semantic (notional) category. Since modality is a semantic category, not a syntactic 
one, it does not seem surprising that not all modals have the same syntactic behavior(s). 
4 I thank a reviewer for his/her suggestion to make these two points clear here. 
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Semantics of Jingran and Guoran 
know, amazing, etc., as a type of modality because these words express 
viewpoints on the situations of the real world and presuppose that the 
propositions they present are true. According to Perkins, words that 
denote evaluation do not talk about situations in the possible worlds and 
therefore are not modals. 
In Mandarin, there is no agreement in the literature as to the syntactic 
categories of words that express evaluation. For example, what are 
categorized as evaluative modals in Hsieh (2005, 2006a, 2006b) are 
identified as adverbs in Liu et al. (1996: 123-124), Li and Thompson 
(1981: 321-322), Zhang (1994: 212-214), etc. 
Hsieh (2006a) proposes that source of opinion or attitude and 
possible world are the two key semantic ingredients in the definition of 
modality.  Jingran and guoran are both [+source] because they both 
indicate the expectation of the speaker. They are also both [+possible 
world] because, following Chung and Timberlake (1985) and Asher and 
Simpson (1994), Hsieh (2006a: 16) states that “once the speaker 
evaluates a proposition, the proposition is no longer a description of pure 
fact. Therefore, evaluative modality deals with non-real worlds, i.e., 
possible worlds [translation mine].” Since jingran and guoran both have 
the expectation of the speaker as their source
5 of evaluation and they 
both talk about situations in possible worlds, Hsieh concludes that they 
are modals. 
Hsieh (2006a, 2006b) proposes that evaluative modals such as 
jingran and guoran evaluate the speaker’s presupposition and that they 
differ in terms of convergence and divergence.
6 By convergence, she 
means that the (non)existence or (non)occurrence of a situation presented 
by the evaluative modals matches the speaker’s presupposition about the 
situation, and by divergence she means that the (non)existence or 
(non)occurrence of the situation contradicts the speaker’s presupposition 
about the situation. See the examples below. 
 
 
                                                 
5 For Hsieh, all modals need a source of opinion, attitude or evaluation. Those whose 
source is encoded in the semantics of modals, e.g., the source of evaluation for jingran 
and  guoran is the speaker’s expectation, are [+source]. Those whose source is not 
encoded in the semantics of modals are [−source]. For the latter, the source is usually the 
subject.  
6 Hsieh identifies another type of evaluative modals that expresses wish. This type of 
evaluative modals is not discussed in this paper. 
101 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jiun-Shiung Wu 
(4) a. lisi guoran    chenggong le 
     L i s i   GUORAN  succeed  Prc 
     ‘Lisi  succeeded  (as  expected by the speaker)!’ 
b. lisi jingran    chenggong le 
     L i s i   JINGRAN  succeed  Prc 
          ‘Lisi succeeded (contrary to the expectation of the speaker)!’ 
 
In (4a), the speaker presupposes Lisi’s success. Guoran is used to 
express that the occurrence of the situation Lisi succeed matches the 
speaker’s presupposition. In (4b), the speaker presupposes that Lisi 
would not succeed. Jingran is used to denote that the occurrence of the 
situation Lisi succeed contradicts the speaker’s presupposition. 
In addition to establishing that evaluative adverbials such as jingran, 
guoran, etc., are modals, Hsieh (2005, 2006a, 2006b) raises the 
following four points about evaluative modals: First, they express the 
speaker’s presupposition, second, they predicate on known facts, which 
have happened, third, they are antonyms, and fourth, their semantics 
cannot be captured by possibility and necessity, unlike the modals 
discussed in Kratzer (1977, 1981). 
However, Hsieh’s generalizations about jingran and guoran are not 
accurate.
7 First, the source for evaluative modals is not always the 
speaker, as (3) shows, and what these two modals evaluate is not a 
presupposition. It is well-accepted that a presupposition cannot be 
affected by negation, e.g., Fodor (1979), Wilson and Sperber (1979), 
etc.
8 However, negation does change so-called presuppositions in 
examples with jingran and guoran. See the examples below. 
 
(5) a. John’s brother lives here. 
b. John’s brother does not live here. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Since this paper deals with only two evaluative modals, I will not commit myself to the 
nature of Hsieh’s analysis of the other evaluative modals, though I suspect that similar 
problems may also apply based on the discussion of Hsieh’s analysis in this section. But I 
will leave this issue for future studies. 
8 There are contexts where presupposition is canceled or fails, as discussed in McCulloch 
(1989), Fodor (1979), etc. However, in the examples above, jingran and guoran do not 
appear in one of the contexts. Therefore, no presupposition failure can be observed even 
if there is any presupposition. 
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Semantics of Jingran and Guoran 
(6)  a.  zhangsan  jingran  lai   le 
     Z h a n g s a n   JINGRAN come Prc 
     ‘Zhangsan  came  (contrary  to  expectation).’ 
b. zhangsan jingran mei    lai 
     Z h a n g s a n   JINGRAN not come   
    ‘Zhangsan did not come (contrary to expectation).’ 
 
(7)  a.  zhangsan  guoran   lai   le 
     Z h a n g s a n   GUORAN come Prc 
     ‘Zhangsan  came  (as  expected).’ 
b. zhangsan guoran    mei lai 
     Z h a n g s a n   GUORAN not come 
‘Zhangsan did not come (as expected).’ 
 
In (5a), the presupposition is that John has a brother. (5b) is the 
negation of (5a), but the presupposition is not affected and remains the 
same. Jingran and guoran do not behave like this. In (6), the expectation 
in (6a) is that Zhangsan would not come, but in (6b) it is that Zhangsan 
would come. Similarly, the expectation in (7a) is that Zhangsan would 
come, but in (7b) it is that Zhangsan would not come. As these two sets 
of examples show, negation makes a difference to the propositions that 
jingran and guoran present. Therefore, the expectation expressed by 
jingran and guoran is not a presupposition. 
Second, these two evaluative modals do not necessarily predicate on 
a known fact which has happened. In the examples above, jingran and 
guoran both present a situation that has taken place, that is, they both 
predicate on a fact that has happened. However, they can also predicate 
on a situation that has not yet occurred. See the examples below. 
 
(8)  a.  zhangsan  jingran  hui  canjia   mintian  de  huiyi 
Zhangsan JINGRAN will participate tomorrow DE meeting 
‘Zhangsan will come to tomorrow’s meeting (contrary to   
expectation)!’ 
 
b.  zhangsan  guoran  hui  canjia   mintian  de  huiyi 
Zhangsan GUORAN will participate tomorrow DE meeting 
‘Zhangsan will come to tomorrow’s meeting (as expected)!’ 
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In (8a) and (8b), jingran and guoran predicate on a future event, not 
on an event that has been realized. That is, it is not accurate to claim that 
evaluative modals predicate on known facts that have taken place. 
One might argue that, although a future event has not happened, that 
it can always be a known fact.
9 For example, it is always possible that 
Zhangsan will come to tomorrow’s meeting is a fact known to everyone. 
However, there are examples where these two modals predicate on a 
situation that is not a fact at all. Suppose that due to some 
miscommunication, Lisi thought that Zhangsan liked Xiaomei, even 
though that is not true. Under this scenario, Lisi can still utter (9a) to 
express that Zhangsan’s having liked Xiaomei matches his expectation 
and (9b) to express that Zhangsan’s liking Xiaomei was not expected by 
him. 
 
(9) a. zhangsan guoran    xihuan xiaomei 
Zhangsan GUORAN  like   Xiaomei 
‘Zhangsan liked Xiaomei (as expected)!’ 
b. zhangsan jingran    xihuan xiaomei 
Zhangsan JINGRAN  like  Xiaomei 
‘Zhangsan liked Xiaomei (contrary to expectation)!’ 
 
Thirdly, jingran and guoran are not typical antonyms if they are, in 
fact, antonyms. Antonyms make sentences contradictory, as (10) shows. 
However, jingran and guoran do not seem to represent contradiction as 
in (11). 
 
(10) a. zhangsan zai shangmian shuijiao 
Zhangsan  Prg  top      sleep 
‘Zhangsan was/is sleeping up there.’ 
b. zhangsan zai xiamian shuijiao 
Zhangsan Prg bottom sleep 
‘Zhangsan was/is sleeping down there.’ 
 
(11) a. zhangsan jingran    lai    guo zheli 
Zhangsan JINGRAN come Exp here 
‘Zhansan has been here (contrary to expectation)!’ 
 
                                                 
9 I would like to thank a reviewer for bringing this point to my attention. 
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b. zhangsan guoran    lai    guo zheli 
Zhangsan GUORAN come Exp here 
‘Zhansan has been here (as expected)!’ 
 
In (10), shangmian ‘top, up there’ and xiamian ‘bottom, down there’ 
are antonyms. They make (10a) and (10b) contradictory. That is, if (10a) 
is true, then (10b) is false and vice versa. However, it is not clear how to 
determine the truth values of (11a) and (11b) if the semantics of jingran 
and guoran are not decided. That is, the intuition that jingran and guoran 
are antonyms needs to be verified. 
Given the discussions that Hsieh’s first two generalizations above 
have been show to present inaccuracies and that her third generalization 
awaits verification, I re-examine the data of these two evaluative modals 
in Section 3, then show that Hsieh’s fourth generalization also presents 
problems, i.e., that it is possible to define the semantics of jingran and 
guoran in terms of necessity and possibility, and finally verify whether 
jingran and guoran are antonyms. 
 
 
3. SEMANTICS OF GUORAN AND JINGRAN 
 
In Section 2, I argue that jingran and guoran do not express a 
presupposition and neither do they predicate on a fact that has happened. 
In this section, I would like to argue that the convergence and divergence 
of a situation with respect to expectation are the only key issues relevant 
to the semantics of these two evaluative modals. Let us see more 
examples. 
 
(12) a. ta jingran xihuan lanqiu 
      h e   JINGRAN  like  basketball 
      ‘He  likes  basketball  (contrary  to  expectation)!’ 
            The situation predicated of: He likes basketball. 
The expectation: He does not like basketball. 
b.  ta  jingran  shuo  le  na  zhong  hua 
  h e   JINGRAN  say  Pfv  that  kind  words 
    ‘He said such kind of words (contrary to expectation)!’ 
      The  situation  predicated  of: He said such kind of words. 
            The expectation: He would not say such kind of words. 
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c.  ta  jingran  hui  canjia    nide  hunli 
he JINGRAN will participate your wedding 
‘He will come to your wedding (contrary to expectation)!’ 
The situation predicated of: He will come to your wedding. 
The expectation: He will not come to your wedding. 
 
(13) a. ta    jingran bu xihuan lanqiu 
he JINGRAN not like    basketball 
            ‘He does not like basketball (contrary to expectation)!’ 
            The situation predicated of: He does not like basketball. 
The expectation: He likes basketball. 
b. ta    jingran mei shuo zhen hua 
      h e   JINGRAN not    say true words 
            ‘He did not tell the truth (contrary to expectation)!’ 
            The situation predicated of: He did not tell the truth. 
            The expectation: He would tell the truth. 
c.  ta  jingran  bu  hui  canjia    nide  hunli 
      h e   JINGRAN not will participate your wedding 
            ‘He will not come to your wedding (contrary to 
      e x p e c t a t i o n ) ! ’  
            The situation predicated of: He will not come to your wedding. 
            The expectation: He will come to your wedding. 
 
The examples in (12) and (13) show that jingran can predicate on 
present tense sentences, such as (12a) and (13a), on past tense 
sentences,
10 such as (12b) and (13b), and on future tense sentences, such 
as (12c) and (13c). From the six examples above, we can clearly see that 
the expectation is always contrary to the situation predicated of: When 
the expectation is positive, the proposition predicated of is negative; 
when the expectation is negative, the proposition predicated of is 
positive. That is, the proposition that describes the situation jingran 
presents always has a truth value opposite to that of the expectation. 
 
                                                 
10 Though Mandarin is a tenseless language, e.g., Li and Thompson (1981), there have 
been a few studies that have tried to determine the temporal reference of a Mandarin 
sentence, such as Smith and Erbaugh (2005), Lin (2003b, 2006), etc. For the temporal 
location of a Mandarin bare sentence, such as (12a), please refer to these three papers. 
For the temporal location of a Mandarin sentence with an aspect marker, such as (12b), 
please refer to Lin (2006). (12c) is future because it contains a future modal hui.  
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Semantics of Jingran and Guoran 
Bearing the above generalization in mind, let us look at the examples 
of guoran below. 
 
(14) a. ta guoran    xihuan lanqiu 
he GUORAN  like  basketball 
‘He likes basketball (as expected)!’ 
The situation predicated of: He likes basketball. 
The expectation: He likes basketball. 
b.  ta  guoran    shuo  le  na  zhong  hua 
he GUORAN  say  Pfv  that  kind  words 
‘He said such kind of words (as expected)!’ 
The situation predicated of: He said such kind of words. 
The expectation: He said such kind of words. 
c.  ta  guoran  hui  canjia     nide  hunli
11
he GUORAN will participate your wedding 
‘He will come to your wedding (as expected)!’ 
The situation predicated of: He will come to your wedding. 
The expectation: He will come to your wedding. 
 
(15)  a.  ta  guoran  bu  xihuan  lanqiu 
he GUORAN  not  like  basketball 
‘He does not like basketball (as expected)!’ 
The situation predicated of: He does not like basketball. 
The expectation: He does not like basketball. 
b. ta guoran    mei shuo zhen hua 
he GUORAN  not  say  true  words 
‘He did not tell the truth (as expected)!’ 
The situation predicated of: He did not tell the truth. 
The expectation: He did not tell the truth. 
c.  ta  guoran  bu  hui  canjia     nide  hunli 
he GUORAN not will participate your wedding 
‘He will not come to your wedding (as expected)!’ 
The situation predicated of: He will not come to your wedding. 
The expectation: He will not come to your wedding. 
 
                                                 
11 A reviewer suggests that a future use of guoran is not good and this example is 
unacceptable. I am afraid that there is a discrepancy in native speaker’s intuition and 
judgments of grammaticality. The people I consulted all agree with me in that guoran can 
present a future situation and this example is good. 
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Just like jingran,  guoran can also predicate on present tense 
sentences, such as (14a), and (15a), on past tense sentences, such as (14b) 
and (15b), and on future tense sentences, such as (14c) and (15c). But, 
unlike jingran, which expresses divergence, we can see clearly from the 
six examples in (14) and (15) that the expectation always converges with 
the situation guoran predicates on. That is, the proposition that describes 
the situation guoran presents always has the same truth value as that of 
the expectation. 
One point that needs to be addressed is that there is a type of 
agreement between the proposition predicated of by the two evaluative 
modals and the expectation.
12 For the purpose of discussion here, we will 
put aside whether the proposition predicated on has a truth value which 
is the same as or opposite to that of the expectation.   
The first kind of agreement is the agreement in tense, aspect and 
modals. That is, the proposition predicated on by evaluative modals must 
agree with the expectation in terms of tense, aspect and modals. For 
example, in (12a) and (14a), the propositions predicated on are all 
present tense and the expectations in these examples must be present 
tense as well. In (12c), (13c), (14c) and (15c), the propositions 
predicated of are (epistemic) future and the expectations in these 
examples must also be (epistemic) future. In (11), the propositions 
predicated on are (experientially) perfective, and their expectations must 
be (experientially) perfective too. 
The expectations for negative propositions are more divergent. A 
negative proposition can agree with the expectation in tense, as in (13a) 
and (15a). But, negative propositions can select their own expectations. 
See the examples below. 
 
(16) a. ta    jingran mei lai 
he JINGRAN no come 
‘He did not come (contrary to expectation).’ 
The situation predicated of: He did not come. 
The expectation: He came or he would (or should) come. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 I would like to thank a reviewer for pointing out this matter to me. 
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b. ta jingran bu lai   
he JINGRAN no come 
‘He will not come (contrary to expectation).’ 
The situation predicated of: He will not come or he is not willing 
to come. 
The expectation: He will come or he is willing to come. 
c. ta    guoran mei lai 
he GUORAN no come 
‘He did not come (as expected).’ 
The situation predicated of: He did not come. 
The expectation: He did not come or he would not (or should not) 
come. 
d. ta    guoran bu lai   
he GUORAN no come 
‘He will not come (as expected).’ 
The situation predicated of: He will not come or he is not willing 
to come. 
The expectation: He will not come or he is not willing to come. 
 
 
The negative marker mei is used to negate a past situation and bu is 
used to negate a future tense (Li and Thompson 1981). Therefore, when 
these two markers occur with jingran or guoran, the expectations can 
remain in the simple past tense as in the underlined part in the 
expectation of (16a) and (16c), or in the simple future tense as in the 
underlined part in the expectation of (16b) and (16d). However, since a 
negative past situation has not really taken place, the occurrence of the 
event could be a stipulation (expressed by the epistemic modal would) or 
an obligation (expressed by the deontic modal should) in (16a) and (16c). 
On the other hand, bu is ambiguous either in referring to the negation of 
a situation or to the negation of willingness. This is why the expectation 
in (16b) and (16d) can denote either simple future tense or the will of the 
subject. 
Even though the expectations for negative propositions are more 
divergent, there is still agreement: Although the expectation for mei can 
be simple past tense, epistemic or deontic, it can never be simple future 
or the will of the subject; although the expectation for bu can be simple 
future or the will of the subject, it can never be simple past tense, 
epistemic or deontic. The expectation for a negative proposition must 
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agree with the negative proposition in the semantics identified by the 
negative markers. 
To sum up, the discussion above shows that it is possible to decide 
the truth value of a proposition containing jingran and guoran by 
examining the truth value of the proposition that jingran or guoran 
presents, with respect to the expectation. The proposition that describes 
the situation that jingran presents always has a truth value opposite to 
that of the expectation, while the proposition that describes the situation 
guoran presents always has the same truth value as that of the 
expectation. In addition, the expectation must agree with the proposition 
predicated of by jingran or guoran in terms of tense, aspect, modals, and 
the semantics of the negative markers as discussed above. 
 
 
4. FORMALIZING THE GENERALIZATIONS 
 
Hsieh (2006a, 2006b) proposes that the semantics of evaluative 
modals cannot be captured by possibility and necessity. However, I 
would like to demonstrate here that Hsieh is not correct in this respect 
and that the semantics of jingran and guoran can be defined in terms of 
necessity. 
In the previous section, I show that the truth value of jingran(P) or 
guoran(P), where P is a proposition, can be determined by examining the 
truth value of P with respect to the expectation. This is a first step toward 
understanding the semantics of jingran and guoran. The next question is 
what the expectation is and how to examine the truth value of a 
proposition with respect to the expectation. 
The expectation is a proposition. Kratzer (1981) proposes that a 
proposition is a subset of the set of all possible worlds, i.e., a proposition 
is a set of possible worlds. Divergence and convergence can be 
formalized as simple necessity (Kratzer 1981) and ‘simple necessity of 
negation’. Kratzer (1981) defines the related concepts as below: 
 
(17) Let W be the set of all possible worlds 
a. Simple Necessity:   
A proposition is a simple necessity in a world w with respect to 
the conversational background B if and only if it follows from 
B(w). 
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b. Logical Consequence: 
A proposition p follows from a set of propositions A if and only if 
p is true in all worlds of W where all propositions of A are true. 
c. Truth of a Proposition: 
A proposition p is true in a world w ∈ W if and only if w ∈ p. 
Otherwise, p is false in w. 
 
Basically, simple necessity means that a proposition is true in all of 
the possible worlds where the conversational background is true. In our 
present case, simple necessity captures the essence of the semantics of 
guoran. However, In order to define the semantics of jingran, we need 
‘simple necessity of negation’, which means that a proposition is false in 
all of the possible worlds where the conversational background is true. 
Following Kratzer’s (1981) idea of simple necessity, I define the simple 
necessity of negation as follows: 
 
(18) a. Simple Necessity of Negation 
A proposition is a simple necessity of negation in a world w with 
respect to the conversational background B if and only if it does 
not follow from B(w). 
b. Logical Inconsequence 
A proposition p does not follow from a set of propositions A if 
and only if p is false in all worlds of W where all propositions of 
A are true. 
 
Given that the evaluation of a proposition presented by guoran and 
jingran is equivalent to the evaluation of the proposition with respect to 
the expectation, and that the expectation can be regarded as a kind of 
conversational background, which is referred to as an evaluative 
conversational background in this paper, a proposition having the same 
truth value as that of the expectation means that the proposition is true in 
all of the possible worlds where the conversational background 
representing the expectation is true; a proposition having the truth value 
opposite to that of the expectation means that the proposition is false in 
all of the possible worlds where the conversational background standing 
for the expectation is true. Therefore, the semantics of jingran and 
guoran can be stated as in (19). 
 
 
111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jiun-Shiung Wu 
(19) a. Evaluative Conversational Background: In view of what is   
expected ... 
An evaluative conversational background is a function B which 
assigns sets of propositions to members of W, which is the set of 
all possible worlds, such that for any w ∈ W: B(w) contains all 
those propositions p such that p is expected in w.
13
b.  Jingran presents a proposition which is a simple necessity of 
negation in w with respect to an evaluative conversational 
background B. 
c. Guoran presents a proposition which is a simple necessity in w 
with respect to an evaluative conversational background B. 
 
Kratzer (1981) proposes that a conversational background constitutes 
the  modal base because it decides for every world the set of worlds 
which are accessible from the world. With the incorporation of the idea 
of the ordering source, the semantics of jingran and guoran can be 
defined formally as in (20). 
 
(20) Let B be the modal base for jingran and guoran, which an 
evaluative conversational background forms.   
a.  jingran(p)  
B,≤, w = 1 iff for all w’ ∈ B(w) there is a w’’ ∈ B(w) 
with w’’ ≤w w’ such that  p
w’’=0.
14 
 
                                                 
13 A reviewer asks how the general expectation is formalized. It is formalized here in the 
definition of an evaluative conversational background. In this definition, it is stated that p 
is expected in w. Because the identity of the person having the expectation is not 
specified, it allows for the possibility that the expectation is the speaker’s, someone else’s 
or a general one.   
14 A reviewer kindly suggests that ‘incompatible’ is a better term to use than ‘false’. 
There are two reasons why I do not use compatibility or incompatibility in this version. 
First, in Kratzer (1981), compatibility is used to define possibility, instead of necessity. 
Compatibility and incompatibility are mistakenly used in the earlier version. Second, a 
proposition being compatible or incompatible with the expectation in the literal sense is 
actually the same as a proposition being true or false with respect to the expectation. A 
proposition being compatible with the expectation means that the proposition is the 
expectation, which equals the proposition being true in the possible worlds where the 
expectation is true. A proposition being incompatible with the expectation means that the 
proposition is not the expectation, which means that the proposition is false in all of the 
possible worlds where the expectation is true. Based on these two reasons, I do not use 
‘compatible’ or ‘incompatible’ in this paper. 
112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Semantics of Jingran and Guoran 
b.   guoran(p)
 B,≤, w = 1 iff for all w’ ∈ B(w) there is a w” ∈ B(w) 
with w” ≤w w’ and  p
 w’’ = 1.
15
 
(20a) thus says that jingran(P) is true with respect to a modal base B 
which an evaluative conversational background forms, an ordering 
source ≤ and a possible world w if, and only if, for all possible worlds w’ 
that are members of B(w) there is a possible world w’’ such that w’’ is at 
least as close to w as w’ and p is false in w’’. This semantics instantiates 
the essential point that the proposition jingran presents is a simple 
necessity of negation in a possible world w with respect to a modal base 
formed by an evaluative conversational background. 
(20b) says that guoran(P) is true with respect to a modal base B 
formed by an evaluative conversational background, an ordering source 
≤ and a possible world w if and only if for all possible worlds w’ that are 
members of the modal base B there is a possible world w’’ such that w’’ 
is at least as close to w as w’ and p is true in w’’. This semantics captures 
the essential point that the proposition guoran presents is a simple 
necessity in a possible world w with respect to a modal base formed by 
an evaluative conversational background. 
In Section 2, I argue that Hsieh’s (2005, 2006a, 2006b) 
generalizations about jingran and guoran are not accurate. She proposes 
four points about these two evaluative modals (and the other evaluative 
modals). First, jingran and guoran express the presupposition of speaker. 
Second, they predicate on known facts that have happened. Third, they 
are antonyms. Last, their semantics cannot be defined in terms of 
necessity and possibility. 
(20) clearly shows that the semantics of jingran and guoran can be 
defined in terms of necessity. The semantics in (20) show that at least for 
two of the evaluative modals, i.e., jingran and guoran discussed in this 
paper, Hsieh’s (2005, 2006a, 2006b) generalization is not accurate that 
                                                 
15 A reviewer asks, “What are the differences between ‘model-theoretic semantics’ and 
‘generative syntax/semantics’ with respect to modality in this paper?” Generative syntax 
deals with syntax, for example, the location in a syntactic tree where modals are located, 
not with the semantics of modals. It is not clear to me as to what generative semantics 
refers. If it refers to semantics in generative grammar, e.g., Heim and Kratzer (1998), it is 
still a type of model-theoretic semantics. It is just that the syntax used in Heim and 
Kratzer’s (1998) approach to semantics is Chomskyan syntax. In this paper, I do not 
discuss the syntax of jingran and guoran because their syntax is irrelevant to the main 
points addressed here. 
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the semantics of evaluative modals cannot be captured by necessity and 
possibility. The semantics argued in this section can avoid the problems 
of presuppositional failure because jingran and guoran are not related to 
presuppositions.  
The evaluative conversational background in (19) also avoids the 
problem of Hsieh that jingran and guoran evaluate against speaker’s 
expectation, because in (19) p is expected in w and the expecter is not 
specified.  
The semantics in (20) also support native the speaker’s intuition that 
jingran and guoran are antonyms. With the semantics in (20), we can 
easily demonstrate how jingran and guoran cause contradiction. Under 
the same scenario, i.e. for all possible worlds w’ that are members of the 
modal base B, there is a possible world w’’ such that w’’ is at least as 
close to w as w’ and p is true in w’’, jingran(P) is false, but guoran(P) is 
true. For example, when the expectation is Zhangsan likes Xiaomei, then 
zhangsan guoran xihuan xiaomei ‘Zhangsan likes Xiaomei, as expected’ 
will be true, but zhangsan jingrani xihuan xiaomei ‘Zhangsan likes 
Xiaomei, contrary to the expectation’ will be false. The correct reflection 
of the intuition of a native speaker about the two evaluative modals 
being antonyms, in turn, verifies the accuracy of the semantics proposed 
in this section.   
Finally, the semantics in (20) do not require that these two modals 
predicate on known facts that have happened. The two evaluative modals 
predicate on the expectation, which can be a fact or not. 
To sum up, the semantics of jingran and guoran argued in this paper 
do not present the problems generated by Hsieh’s generalizations, and 
they serve to verify the intuition that jingran and guoran are antonyms. It 
is also demonstrated that a universally valid semantic (notional) category 
of modality can be achieved since the semantics of jingran and guoran 
can be defined in terms of necessity. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
In this paper, I argue against Hsieh’s (2005, 2006a, 2006b) proposal 
with regard to the semantics of evaluative modals. I show that at least 
two of the evaluative modals, i.e., jingran and guoran, do not express the 
speaker’s presupposition. I further argue for the model-theoretic 
semantics for these two evaluative modals.   
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On the one hand, jingran(P) is true with respect to a modal base B, 
an ordering source ≤ and a possible world w if, and only if, for all 
possible worlds w’ that are members of B(w), there is a possible world 
w’’ such that w’’ is at least as close to w as w’ and p is false in w’’. This 
semantics captures the essential point that the proposition jingran 
presents is a simple necessity of negation in a possible world w with 
respect to a modal base formed by an evaluative conversational 
background. 
On the other hand, guoran(P) is true with respect to a modal base B 
formed by an evaluative conversational background, an ordering source 
≤ and a possible world w if, and only if, for all possible worlds w’ that 
are members of the modal base B there is a possible world w’’ such that 
w’’ is at least as close to w as w’ and p is true in w’’. This semantics 
instantiates the essential point that the proposition guoran presents is a 
simple necessity in a possible world w with respect to a modal base 
formed by an evaluative conversational background. 
I also try to fit modality in Mandarin into the bigger picture of 
modality in general. I show that, at least for two of the evaluative modals 
jingran and guoran, it is possible to achieve a universally valid notional 
category of modality, similar to the works of Kratzer (1981), and that the 
differences in the inventories of modality in different languages are due 
to language-specific choices for modal bases. 
Little attention, if any, has been paid to the formal semantics of 
evaluative modals. This paper is the first attempt in the literature of 
modality in Chinese, and probably the first one in the literature of 
modality in general, to provide formal semantics for evaluative modals 
and proves that, at least for jingran and guoran, the semantics of 
evaluative modals can be defined in terms of necessity. This paper serves 
as a starting point and a base for comparison for future studies of the 
(formal) semantics of the other evaluative modals in Mandarin and of 
those in other languages.
16   
                                                 
16 A reviewer asks why the result of this paper is not applied to the other modals. If “the 
other modals” means epistemic, deontic and dynamic modals, the semantics of those 
types of modals in Mandarin are not that different from the semantics of such types of 
modals in other languages, e.g., German, English, etc., which have been discussed 
extensively in the literature such as Kratzer (1977, 1981), Li (2003), Wang (2003), etc. If 
“the other modals” refer to other evaluative modals, this paper serves as a pilot study and 
a starting point for further studies on the semantics of the (other) evaluative modals in 
Mandarin and in general. 
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